Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a quantitative framework for explaining consciousness phenomenon, positing that conscious systems comprise elements integrated through causal properties. We apply IIT 3.0 and 4.0 -- the latest iterations of this framework -- to sequences of Large Language Model (LLM) representations, analyzing data derived from existing Theory of Mind (ToM) test results. Our study systematically investigates whether the differences of ToM test performances, when presented in the LLM representations, can be revealed by IIT estimates, i.e., $Φ^{\max}$ (IIT 3.0), $Φ$ (IIT 4.0), Conceptual Information (IIT 3.0), and $Φ$-structure (IIT 4.0). Furthermore, we compare these metrics with the Span Representations independent of any estimate for consciousness. This additional effort aims to differentiate between potential "consciousness" phenomena and inherent separations within LLM representational space. We conduct comprehensive experiments examining variations across LLM transformer layers and linguistic spans from stimuli. Our results suggest that sequences of contemporary Transformer-based LLM representations lack statistically significant indicators of observed "consciousness" phenomena but exhibit intriguing patterns under $\textit{spatio}$-permutational analyses. The Appendix and code are available as Supplementary Materials at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163.

Understanding human intentions through visual cues is a fundamental aspect of social intelligence, allowing effective communication, collaboration, and interaction [2]. This capability, often referred to as the Theory of Mind (ToM), involves the ability to infer the beliefs, desires, and intentions of others based on observable behaviors and environmental contexts [9, 7, 12]. Recent advances in VLMs have demonstrated impressive abilities in multimodal reasoning, combining visual and textual information to perform complex tasks [5, 10, 13]. However, their capability to perform ToM-like reasoning, specifically in interpreting intentions from visual cues, remains underexplored. For example, Etesam et al. [4] only investigate the emotional component of ToM, instead of exploring more broad categories such as intentions, religions, etc. Jin et al. [6] frame the ToM task as a binary choice question, without requiring VLMs to engage in open-ended reasoning. Consequently, this approach may not fully capture the VLMs' capability to perform ToM tasks. To further highlight, ToM tasks present unique challenges for VLMs, requiring both visual feature extraction and contextual reasoning to infer hidden mental states. Thus, our study, which evaluates VLM performance on ToM tasks through an open-ended question framework, is pivotal to assessing VLMs' capacity for advanced multimodal understanding and social intelligence.

The last couple of years have witnessed emerging research that appropriates Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks designed for humans to benchmark LLM's ToM capabilities as an indication of LLM's social intelligence. However, this approach has a number of limitations. Drawing on existing psychology and AI literature, we summarize the theoretical, methodological, and evaluation limitations by pointing out that certain issues are inherently present in the original ToM tasks used to evaluate human's ToM, which continues to persist and exacerbated when appropriated to benchmark LLM's ToM. Taking a human-computer interaction (HCI) perspective, these limitations prompt us to rethink the definition and criteria of ToM in ToM benchmarks in a more dynamic, interactional approach that accounts for user preferences, needs, and experiences with LLMs in such evaluations. We conclude by outlining potential opportunities and challenges towards this direction.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to understand and reflect on the mental states of others. Although this capability is crucial for human interaction, testing on Large Language Models (LLMs) reveals that they possess only a rudimentary understanding of it. Although the most capable closed-source LLMs have come close to human performance on some ToM tasks, they still perform poorly on complex variations of the task that involve more structured reasoning. In this work, we utilize the concept of "pretend-play", or ``Simulation Theory'' from cognitive psychology to propose ``Decompose-ToM'': an LLM-based inference algorithm that improves model performance on complex ToM tasks. We recursively simulate user perspectives and decompose the ToM task into a simpler set of functions: subject identification, question-reframing, world model updation, and knowledge availability. We test the algorithm on higher-order ToM tasks and a task testing for ToM capabilities in a conversational setting, demonstrating that our approach shows significant improvement across models compared to baseline methods while requiring minimal prompt tuning across tasks and no additional model training.

Theory of Mind (ToM) can be used to assess the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in complex scenarios where social reasoning is required. While the research community has proposed many ToM benchmarks, their hardness varies greatly, and their complexity is not well defined. This work proposes a framework to measure the complexity of ToM tasks. We quantify a problem's complexity as the number of states necessary to solve it correctly. Our complexity measure also accounts for spurious states of a ToM problem designed to make it apparently harder. We use our method to assess the complexity of five widely adopted ToM benchmarks. On top of this framework, we design a prompting technique that augments the information available to a model with a description of how the environment changes with the agents' interactions. We name this technique Discrete World Models (DWM) and show how it elicits superior performance on ToM tasks.

Recent work on dialogue-based collaborative plan acquisition (CPA) has suggested that Theory of Mind (ToM) modelling can improve missing knowledge prediction in settings with asymmetric skill-sets and knowledge. Although ToM was claimed to be important for effective collaboration, its real impact on this novel task remains under-explored. By representing plans as graphs and by exploiting task-specific constraints we show that, as performance on CPA nearly doubles when predicting one's own missing knowledge, the improvements due to ToM modelling diminish. This phenomenon persists even when evaluating existing baseline methods. To better understand the relevance of ToM for CPA, we report a principled performance comparison of models with and without ToM features. Results across different models and ablations consistently suggest that learned ToM features are indeed more likely to reflect latent patterns in the data with no perceivable link to ToM. This finding calls for a deeper understanding of the role of ToM in CPA and beyond, as well as new methods for modelling and evaluating mental states in computational collaborative agents.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) demonstrate that their capabilities are comparable, or even superior, to humans in many tasks in natural language processing. Despite this progress, LLMs are still inadequate at social-cognitive reasoning, which humans are naturally good at. Drawing inspiration from psychological research on the links between certain personality traits and Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning, and from prompt engineering research on the hyper-sensitivity of prompts in affecting LLMs capabilities, this study investigates how inducing personalities in LLMs using prompts affects their ToM reasoning capabilities. Our findings show that certain induced personalities can significantly affect the LLMs' reasoning capabilities in three different ToM tasks. In particular, traits from the Dark Triad have a larger variable effect on LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2, and Mistral across the different ToM tasks. We find that LLMs that exhibit a higher variance across personality prompts in ToM also tends to be more controllable in personality tests: personality traits in LLMs like Figure 1: Overview of PHAnToM. Our work investigates GPT-3.5, Llama 2 and Mistral can be controllably how eight different personality prompts (Big Five adjusted through our personality prompts. OCEAN and Dark Triad) affects LLMs' ability to perform In today's landscape where role-play is a common three theory-of-mind reasoning tasks (Information strategy when using LLMs, our research Access (IA), Answerability (AA), and Belief Understanding highlights the need for caution, as models that (BU)).